
Saudi Arabia and the Genocide of
Muslims
in Bosnia-Hercegovina
Dr. Daryl Champion
From time to
time, tragic events strike the Muslim world that elicit an immediate reaction
from Muslim states. Perhaps the best known and one of the most sustained, if
not the most urgent, Muslim calls for help in recent times has arisen from the
plight of the Muslim population of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Bosnian Muslims and
their culture have been subject to aggression and atrocities to an extent that
has been unknown in Europe since the Second World War; indeed, the extent of
this aggression, which has spawned the term ‘ethnic cleansing’, has verged on
the genocidal. This has occurred despite the fact that the Muslims are a
majority in their country – a republic declared independent of Yugoslavia in
early 1992 after a national referendum, and a republic formally recognized by
the United Nations.1
Although
genocidal acts of aggression against the Bosnian Muslims received wide coverage
throughout the world, the Western powers involved in the Balkans appeared
powerless to prevent this aggression; similarly, aid to Bosnia appeared barely
sufficient in the circumstances. However, in the Muslim world, sympathy for the
Bosnians’ situation was immediate and unfettered; Muslim governments likewise
responded with material and diplomatic support. Saudi Arabia has been deeply
involved in Muslim aid to Bosnia; this aid has been forthcoming from the Saudi
state, from the Saudi people, and personally from members of the Saudi royal
family, and has amounted to more than US$100 million.
This
chapter will first sketch the history and nature of the European attitudes to
Islam that undoubtedly lie behind contemporary Western European states’
attitudes to the prospect of a Muslim Bosnian state today. This background will
assist in arriving at an understanding of the moralistic posturing of the
Western European powers over Bosnia, despite the fact that decisive protective
action has not been forthcoming. This stance has effectively permitted the
genocide of a nation and the destruction of a state. The inadequacy and,
arguably, the hostility of the European response to the Bosnian crisis is thus
outlined.
In
contrast to the attitudes and inaction of European states has been the reaction
of the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia has figured prominently as a friend of the
Bosnian people and state; consequently, this chapter moves on from the general
European position on Bosnia to the specific position of Saudi Arabia – an
exercise in contrast that highlights the difference in attitudes between a
European collectivity that has proved itself hostile to the formation of a new
Muslim European state on the one hand and, on the other hand, a Middle Eastern
state that looks upon Bosnia as part of the Muslim umma, and therefore
deserving of support. This position is consistent both with Saudi Arabia’s
status as the host of the holy places of Islam and with its projected role as
the protector of Muslim causes worldwide. And thus the extent of Saudi Arabian
aid to the republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and what this aid means both to
Bosnia and to Saudi Arabia, will then be discussed; and, in particular, the
following questions will be addressed:
§
What exactly is
Saudi Arabia doing for Bosnia?
§
As perhaps the
leading and most influential Arab power, is Saudi Arabia doing enough for
Bosnia, and could Saudi Arabia be doing more for Bosnians?
It
should also be noted that ‘ethnic cleansing’ – although the term itself was
first coined with respect to the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, and most
horrifically in relation to the Serb and Croat treatment of Bosnian Muslims –
is not a phenomenon of the late twentieth century. In fact, the ethnic
cleansing of Muslims in mainland Europe has a long history, and can be traced
back to medieval Spain and the Spanish Reconquista, which, during the eleventh
and twelfth centuries, saw increased and more systematic killing of Muslims
accompanied by a more conscious desire to eliminate Muslims from the peninsula.
Attempts to extinguish Islam and Muslim culture became progressively harsher,
until the final expulsion of Muslims from Granada in February 1502.3
Put briefly,
an anti-Islamic European intellectual heritage informs what has become the
general perception of Islam in the West.4 Thus, from the time of
al-Andalus (Andalusia: Muslim Spain, c.711–1492) to the present, European
attitudes toward a Muslim presence in Europe have been unaccommodating. A long
history of anti-Islamic fear and loathing has projected itself from the past
into the present, and has been given a renewed poignancy and popularity by the
Western media, and the case of Bosnia has been no exception. The bogey of
Muslim fundamentalism has been raised in Bosnia by a Western world that has not
yet come to terms with its own demons, which caused so much death and
destruction during the Second World War. The fact that an independent Bosnia
would be largely Muslim gave a great psychological advantage to Western
power-brokers, and found its place in the public relations campaigns designed
to cover inaction while the Bosnian Muslim population was subjected to
unprovoked atrocities intended to bring about its capitulation. It is a tragic
and lamentable irony that a Western world that had spent so much energy
condemning the excesses of Nazi Germany and Stalinism should allow similar
excesses, albeit on a smaller scale, to occur in modern Europe.
The Inadequacy of the European Response to Genocide in
Bosnia5
Although
Bosnia has enjoyed relative calm and firm steps toward reconstruction since the
signing of the Elysée Treaty on 14 December 1995, the wounds of the recent past
will take a long time to heal. An important question remains, however, and it
relates to the adequacy of the Western response to the infliction of major
humanitarian atrocities against a nation in Europe’s own backyard. The
aggression against the Muslims of Bosnia consisted of ‘mass murder, rape, and
vandalism …’.6 Perhaps the single most shocking transgression
against humanity in Europe since the Second World War, and one that underlined
the inadequacy of UN and Western European responses to the aggression against
Bosnia, was the July 1995 massacre of approximately 7,000–8,000 Bosnians in the
UN ‘safe haven’ of Srebrenica.
On a par with the Srebrenica atrocity in a
collective sense was the brutality of Serb- and Croat-operated concentration
camps and rape camps, and the use of rape as a strategy of terror and
psychological warfare: by late 1992, European Community authorities had
estimated the number of rape victims in Bosnia-Hercegovina to be 20,000. The
Sarajevo State Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes put the number at
50,000 as of October 1992. The Bosnian government also estimated that up to
35,000 Bosnian women had been ‘deliberately impregnated … held captive and
released only after abortion [became] impossible’, by Serbs as a matter of
organized political and military policy.7 Slavenka Drakulic8
states that: ‘women [were] raped everywhere and at all times, and victims are
of all ages, including 4-year-old girls and 80-year-old grandmothers’.
In
the case of Bosnia, Western policy appears to have been, and may still prove to
be, one based on the proposition that prevention is better than cure – that is,
it is better to prevent the establishment of a new Muslim state in Europe
rather than to be faced, at some stage in the future, with a potentially recalcitrant
Muslim government with an alternative world-view. Richard L. Rubenstein, a
professor of religion at Florida State University, states explicitly that:
… both the
United States and the European Community have apparently been willing to
tolerate radical ethnic cleansing policies of the Bosnian Serbs, not excluding
outright genocide, if that is what it takes to prevent the establishment of a
Muslim political beachhead in Europe.9
And the New
York Times columnist, Leslie H. Gelb, has hinted at the nature of Western
Balkans policy as it was revealed to him by his establishment contacts – to
‘feed’ the Muslims ‘while prompting them to surrender’:
Let me be
chillingly blunt about what Western officials told me regarding the Balkan
crisis. They said that nothing they are doing or plan to do is at all likely to
compel the Serbs to stop killing Muslims. … Western policy is merely to provide
enough humanitarian relief for Bosnian Muslims to quiet Western public opinion.10
Any Bosnian
plea for UN or EC help has, in fact, been fatally misplaced, according to many
observers.11 A particularly outrageous position that was taken
officially by the UN command in Bosnia – one that was highlighted after the
deliberate shelling of a Bosnian schoolroom killed a teacher and three young
students in November 1993 – was that the Bosnian army was ‘as likely as the
Serbs to fire shells at Bosnian children’.12 The argument that
Bosnian forces might target their own civilians had ‘an appealing ring to
Western government ministers always ready for reasons not to get involved in
Bosnia: if the Muslims are this conniving, they don’t deserve to be helped’.13
This perverted stance began with the May 1992 Sarajevo ‘bread-line massacre’,
when the UN commander, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, accepted Serb allegations
that the killing of more than twenty civilians and the maiming of another
hundred at a Sarajevo market was not the result of two well-aimed Serb mortar
shells, but of a bomb planted by the Bosnians themselves:
There is
strong but circumstantial evidence … that some really horrifying acts of
cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the Muslims
against their own people, for the benefit of an international audience.14
The myth that
Muslims killed their own civilians for public relations effect soon became
widespread, and began to take on the aura of fact – and every military attack
against civilians was consequently reported with reserve in the Western media.
For example, when three people were killed in the centre of Sarajevo in April
1995, responsibility for the atrocity was qualified by stating that ‘suspected
Serbian mortar shells’ were the cause of death – that mortar fire was
responsible there was no doubt, but the identity of those who fired the rounds
was, apparently, in doubt.15 Indeed, this myth made the transition
to accepted truth a number of times in respected mainstream publications; for
example, in a Time magazine report on the February 1993 World Trade Center
bombing – even before the cause of the explosion was officially announced to be
a bomb – a sub-article assessing likely culprits stated, under the sub-heading
‘The Balkans factions’, that ‘The Bosnian Muslims too have reason to play a
part in the Balkan blame game. They have been known to bomb their own people in
Bosnia, hoping the Serbs and Croats would be held responsible and Western
allies would intervene on their side’.16
MacKenzie’s
acceptance of the Serb position amounts to a situation of collusion with war
criminals on the part of the UN commander, which should not be surprising,
since it had become ‘evident that a genuine partnership … developed between the
nations of Western Europe and the Bosnian Serbs’.17 It should be
noted that later UN commanders, such as General Sir Michael Rose, followed
MacKenzie’s lead in providing excuses for Serb transgressions.18 The
justification for this position was alleged to be the UN’s ‘neutrality’ – a
‘diplomatic deodorant’ according to one commentator.19 In the words
of another analyst, the UN had ‘elevated “impartiality” to the status of a
principle, when in reality it was the disguise for a lack of principle’.20
At least one UN liaison officer in Sarajevo resigned in protest over what he
saw as his superiors’ appeasement of the Serbs.21 This appeasement
was a practice that was carried on after ‘peacekeeping’ forces were transferred
from UN to NATO control, and was still in evidence after the Elysée Treaty,
even when it was clear that Serb aggression was responsible for the death of
innocent civilians.22 NATO also issued a statement in January 1996
to the effect that the Western military alliance would not provide security for
teams investigating war crimes and inspecting massacre sites and mass graves in
Bosnia.23
United Nations personnel in Bosnia during the worst years of genocide
were, of course, drawn from Western countries.24 Rubenstein has
written:
UN officials
in Bosnia were not independent agents. Although they served under the United
Nations flag, they nevertheless carried out the policies of their respective
governments or they would not have been there …
The European
powers that have dispatched troops to serve with the UN ‘peacekeeping’ forces
in Bosnia may adopt a posture of neutrality, but their actions have
consistently fostered the dismemberment of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a viable
political entity.25
Consistent
inaction and even cover-ups support a cynical interpretation of Western policy
in Bosnia. For example: when Serb forces fired missiles at UN ‘peacekeepers’ in
1994, killing a Bangladeshi UN soldier, a request by the Bangladeshis for NATO
air support was denied by UN officials in Sarajevo;26 UN knowledge
of Serb atrocities committed against the civilian population of Bosnia at the
beginning of the war was effectively concealed for three months in 1992;27
and, possibly most damning of all, a BBC television journalist claimed that UN
officials destroyed documentary film depicting UN ‘peacekeepers’ standing by as
Serbs organized the massacre of men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995.28
These and other transgressions, such as the Serb assault against another UN
‘safe haven’ – that in Gorazde, in April 1994 – occurred in the full light of
day, while the lack of Western resolve to take firm action to prevent such
atrocities was cravenly presented as ‘helplessness’ on the part of ‘the
international community’.29 Atrocities such as the Merkale
marketplace massacre of 5 February 1994 were also presented on Western
television reports with ‘the colouring of a natural disaster’.30
The former
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, however, advocated early in the war
the opposite Western reaction to the policy of appeasement. But her reasoning
for military intervention on the Bosnians’ behalf reflected not a concern for
humanitarianism and justice, but clichéd stereotypes of fanatical Muslim
terrorists. Thatcher declared:
…keeping the
Muslims in a united Bosnia would discourage their radicalization, which would
be inevitable if the Muslims were to be dispersed under alien rule. A desperate
Muslim diaspora… could then turn to terrorism. Europe would have created an
Islamic time bomb.31
Moreover,
though the Western world has been reluctant to defend Bosnia from aggression
while at the same time effectively denying Bosnia the right to defend itself
through a Balkans-wide arms embargo, concern has been expressed over military
aid given to the Bosnian army by other Muslim countries. A number of Bosnian
army training camps have been described as ‘terrorist depots’,32 and
a greater commitment to Islam in the Bosnian army has been regarded with
suspicion and concern.33 With such reports, the clichés of Muslim
terrorism running rampant in Europe have been elevated to an officially
acknowledged fear. Needless to say, Muslims throughout the Islamic world feel
differently.
The general
approach of Western security organizations to conflict in the Balkans has
recently been illustrated in a cartoon in the Riyadh Daily34 with
respect to the latest conflict in Kosovo, which, despite Western European
assurances to the contrary, has followed a similar pattern to Bosnia. That is,
rhetoric declaring a firm stand against Serbian aggression has not been backed
up with action, and, while lofty statements of moral resolve are issued in
quick succession from Western capitals, Serbian military forces pursue
unhindered their suppression and persecution of the Muslims of Kosovo. The
cartoon, which shows NATO as a turtle slowly lumbering toward a burning Kosovo,
reflects the general Muslim feeling of frustration over the policies of the
Western European powers in the Balkans. At the height of the Bosnian crisis,
after the massacres in Srebrenica, calls for more direct action in Bosnia could
be heard throughout the Muslim world.
In
Saudi Arabia specifically, the Mufti, Sheikh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz, called on
‘all Muslims to join Bosnian ranks and support them with arms, money and
prayers’.35 The Mufti’s call followed King Fahd’s petition to
Britain, France, Russia, the United States and China in their capacity as the
five permanent members of the UN Security Council, to ‘end the deteriorating
situation’ in Bosnia.36 However, the European powers in particular,
for reasons already outlined in this chapter, chose to disregard such appeals:
the affairs of Europe should remain in European hands, despite the fact that
little was being done to avert genocide. Turkey, staunchly pro-European and a
member of NATO, offered planes and aid as a contribution to a US humanitarian
air-drop operation relatively early in the war: the offer was refused,37
despite the fact that the European countries who had been asked to participate
had actually already declined. Quite simply, the role that Muslim countries
could play to prevent the genocide of a unique, European Muslim entity was
limited by the politics of Europe and the policies of the European states, NATO
and the UN.38
Political,
financial and non-sensitive humanitarian aid were the only options available to
Muslim states wishing to alleviate the unfolding catastrophe in Bosnia.39 Working
within this reality, the Saudi High Commission for the Relief of
Bosnia-Hercegovina was founded by Royal Order in 1992. The Commission is headed
by the Governor of Riyadh Province, Prince Salman bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. The
objectives of the Commission have been stated as follows:40
§
to realize the
principles of equality and co-operation among Muslims;
§
to provide help and
support to those in need in Bosnia-Hercegovina;
and to rebuild families that were divided and/or expelled from their
homes as a result of the war.
To
realize these goals, the Commission, which began operations in 1993,
established a headquarters in Riyadh, with branch offices in Sarajevo, Mostar,
Tuzla, Bihac, Zenica, Split, Zagreb and Vienna.41 The main regional
office is the one in Sarajevo, where the Commission occupies an entire floor of
a large building close to the centre of the city. The Commission works
independently of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), but
has co-operated with Bosnian Islamic organizations. The Commission is
particularly known for its involvement in religious education programmes and,
in Sarajevo, for its financial aid during the winter of 1994–5 and for its
support for orphans; in other regions of Bosnia the Commission has concentrated
on providing material aid (BiH Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic
Relations, pers. comm., 18 June 1998).
The
Commission has publicized the Bosnian cause and has been involved in extensive
fund-raising campaigns in Saudi Arabia. As of March 1998, the Commission had raised
approximately US$40.6 million. King Fahd’s personal donations to the Bosnian
cause are reported to total US$13 million.42 Total relief supplies
provided to Bosnia-Hercegovina stood at 102,000 tons as of March 1998.43
The following supplies and services, listed under broad categories along with
the approximate total cost in US dollars, have been provided to Bosnia.44
Social/general
(US$12.95 million):
§
family sponsorship
§
the operation of 18
refugee camps
§
sponsorship of
orphans
§
educational support
§
Arabic-language
scholarships (in Jordan)
§
glass for school
windows
Construction/reconstruction
projects (US$19.3 million):
§
restoration of 115
mosques
§
construction of a
new central mosque in Tuzla
§
furnishing of 330
mosques
§
construction of an
Islamic school in Mostar
§
construction of an
Islamic college in Bihac
§
construction of a
Saudi cultural centre in Mostar
§
restoration of
schools
§
construction of a
mosque and Islamic centre in Sarajevo
§
reconstruction of
600 houses for Muslims in Brcko
§
construction of
159km of railway from the Croatian port of Ploce to Sarajevo
Health (US$2
million):
§
support for health
services
Food (no
accurate costing):
§
58,000 tons of
various foodstuffs
§
1 million litres of
milk (donated by the Saudi al-Safi company)
§
vegetable seeds
(US$430,000)
Heating (US$3.8
million):
§
the supply of wood,
coal, oil and diesel fuels
Power
(US$243,000):
§
installing gas and
electricity services in Sarajevo
Refugee
repatriation (US$675,000):
§
the repatriation of
more than 8,500 Bosnians
Drinking water
(no accurate costing):
§
the supply of 800
litres of petrol per day for water-pump generators