Russian Reports as a Source on the History of Arabia and the Gulf Region (1898-1904)

Dr. Efim A. Rezvan

Russian intelligence and diplomatic reports concerning Arabia and the Gulf region are much less well known than those of Great Britain, France and Germany. This can be largely explained in terms of two basic factors: first, the regime of overwhelming secrecy and ideological control that shrouded the Soviet archives between the end of the 1920s and the end of the 1980s, and second, the Russian language, which is not widely understood outside the countries of the former communist block. Meanwhile one could conclude a priori that the archives of the Russian empire, which conducted an active policy in the Near and Middle East, must surely contain important information on the local and international politics of Arabia and the Gulf region. An interest in Russian archival material on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states; the continuing opening up of the Russian archives since perestroika; and the many thousands of Arabs who have been educated in Russia – all these factors are going to alter the above-mentioned situation radically in the very near future.

What will need to be the main research routes and landmarks that will help Arab scholars in their research into materials connected with Arabia and the Gulf states in the immense archives of Russia? The interest of the imperial Russian authorities in the region was mainly connected with the following factors:

a. Arabia and the Gulf region as part of the international transport and communications system linking Europe with the basin of the Indian Ocean;

b. the fact that parts of Arabia and the Gulf region were under the influence of the Ottoman empire, the old military adversary of Russia in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East in general; and

c. the fact that Arabia was the motherland of Islam, the religion of millions of citizens of the Russian empire, for whom Arabia’s holy cities constituted mandatory places of pilgrimage.

All these factors were usually interconnected, and gained special importance at the turn of the nineteenth century, which is why the archival files of this period are of special interest (which is not to say that before this period nothing of interest on this subject can be found in the Russian archives), most notably the Russian State Archives on Foreign Policy (Moscow),¹ the Russian State Military and Historical Archives (Moscow), the Russian State Historical Archives (St Petersburg), the Russian State Naval Archives (St Petersburg), and the Archives of the Orientalists of the St Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.²

These various interests of Russia in Arabia and the Gulf all contributed to a felt need of dispatching thither not merely cruisers and gunboats, but also agents of the various Russian state institutions and influence groups.

Arabia and the Gulf Region as Part of the International Transport and Communications System Linking Europe with the Basin of the Indian Ocean The construction of the Baghdad railway and the political and military consequences of the project, the successful Russian penetration in Persia and the sharp rivalry with Britain that therefore grew up there,³ and plans to build a Russian railway from Russian Central Asia to the Persian coast of the Gulf,⁴ all these factors brought about a special interest in Arabia and the Gulf region in Russia at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. It was not only Russia that in this period expressed a special interest in the region. The secret services of Great Britain, Germany and Austria-Hungary all at this period sent special missions to Arabia. ‘Scholars’ and ‘archaeologists’, ‘agronomists’ and ‘tourists’ were all in Arabia collecting important political and military information – one might mention here the names of G. Bell, M. Sykes and J. Smith, A. Musil, and M. Fr. Oppenheim.⁵ The reports and books they left are now important historical sources. But today every serious researcher has to add to the list of these names those of at least four Russians: Adamov, Davletshin, Shelkovnikov and Syromiatnikov.

Were the Russians, in fact, determined to gain a secure ‘warm water port’ in the Gulf? Historians have long debated the existence of such a drive. Recently the idea was dismissed by Dr William Green.⁶ Can the documents from the Russian archives give us the answer to this question?

According to H. V. F. Winstone, this was one of the aims of the journey to Inner Arabia by the Austrian aristocrat and Russian spy Baron Nolde in 1893.⁷

The Central Archives of the Navy in St Petersburg hold documents that shed a new light on Tsarist Russia’s Gulf policy. They cover only the short period from 1899, when active involvement began, until 1903, when Russia became preoccupied with developments in the Far East that led to the Russo-Japanese War.

There were two key reasons for Russia’s interest in the Gulf: its successful infiltration into Persia at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the rivalry between Russian and British colonial interests in the region. The setbacks that Britain suffered at the start of the Boer War undermined its political position in the Middle and Near East, and Britain’s rivals tried to capitalize on this.

Russian politicians were also motivated by the fact that some of the Arab sheikhdoms on the Gulf coast in those days nominally and in theory at least belonged to Tsarist Russia’s long-standing enemy in the Middle East, Ottoman Turkey. At the same time German ambitions to build the Berlin–Baghdad Railway across Turkey, linking the Mediterranean with the Gulf region, clashed with Russian and British economic, military and political interests. This also stimulated Russia’s interest in the Gulf, and especially in Kuwait, where the railway was expected to terminate.

A key instrument of Russian policy in the Gulf was the almost continuous presence of its warships there. ‘Gunboat diplomacy’ was in those days one of the most favoured weapons in the arsenal of international foreign policy. The Central Archives of the Navy in St Petersburg contain major documents tracing Russia’s contacts with many Gulf states, and not only those who received visits from Russian warships. There are also reports by Russian diplomatic representatives, and memoranda and copies of treaties that were sent to the Ministry of the Navy as first-hand information. A review of these documents helps to clarify the history of this small but important chapter in Russian–Arab relations.⁸

The archives contain information on a broad range of issues. The Russian Navy was interested in navigation, weather conditions, anchorages, and the geographical situations of the Gulf ports.⁹ There are also reports on trade and on the economic and political situation.

In the spring of 1899 the German cruiser Arkona suddenly appeared in the Gulf. This alarmed British representatives, who at first mistook her for a Russian warship. When the Russian envoy to Tehran, Argipopulo, learned of this he made a strong recommendation that a Russian warship should indeed be sent to the Gulf.¹⁰ After extensive discussions an opportunity was found to send a shallow- draught gunboat, the Gilyak, to the Gulf – a decision approved by Nicholas II himself.

The files of the Russian State Archives on Foreign Policy contain a message sent by the Russian Foreign Minister V. Lamzdorf to P. Tyrtov, who was in charge of the Ministry of the Navy. It shows the purpose behind the instructions given to the Gilyak’s captain. The aim of sending a Russian ship was: ‘by showing the Russian flag in the Persian Gulf, to indicate to the British and the local authorities alike that we consider the Gulf accessible to the ships of all nations, despite the wish of the British Government to turn it into a closed sea within the sphere of its exclusive interests. So if the Gilyak carries out the mission laid upon her, the purpose will be to make an impression, with no aggressive intent or plans for territorial acquisition’.¹¹

The Gilyak gunboat visited the Gulf (Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Muhammerah, Basra and Kuwait) in February–March, 1899. The Russian diplomats had thoroughly prepared for the visit. Two merchants, Artin Ovanesov and Abbas Aliev, both Russian subjects, had visited Kuwait in 1899 for intelligence and political as well as for trade purposes.

The Gilyak arrived in Kuwait to find that a British messenger boat, the Sphinx, had got there first. The British Consulate Secretary and the captain of the Sphinx both tried to dissuade Mubarak from arranging any special ceremony of welcome. But Mubarak, who had come down especially from the desert to receive the Russian ship, was skilful at playing off Britain against Turkey in his bid to win independence. He saw Russia as a natural ally in an anti-British coalition, and refused to return to the desert. On the contrary, he invited the Russians to his residence, and prepared an exhibition of falconry and riding to hounds for them.

The Russians politely declined the invitation because the Gilyak had to leave; but the visit showed that there were common interests, and encouraged Mubarak to establish friendly relations with the Russians, who were to prove useful to him in the future. The Russian Consul decided to return to Basra by land, and Mubarak gave him a caravan and an escort. Mubarak’s extensive discussions with Kruglov and Ovseyenko during the visit of the Gilyak led him to propose, in the spring of 1901, that Russia should raise its flag over Kuwait.¹² This fact merits particular attention when one considers that only two years earlier Mubarak had signed an agreement with Britain – one that had met with sharp opposition even within his own family.

Russian plans towards Kuwait were serious enough. Newly found documents in the Russian State Military and Historical Archives (Moscow) show that the Russians had started planning for military operations in Kuwait.

In his report, the Gilyak’s captain accurately described the general political situation in the Gulf: Britain was trying to force Turkey out of Qatar and Kuwait with the aim of declaring their ports closed to foreign ships. He emphasized that the Arab sheikhs understood the extent to which, under a nominal Turkish rule, they were virtually independent, whereas a British protectorate would mean an end to independence of any kind. The captain analyses Britain’s policy, which had given the British virtual control of various local Turkish authorities through blackmail, bribes and threats. Indrenius says that Britain often transformed minor troubles in the Gulf into large-scale incidents, claiming that they affected British interests. As a result, the Turkish Wali had been replaced. The captain’s report concludes by describing the reception given to the Russian sailors by local people as exceptionally warm. He felt that they saw the Russians as allies against the British.¹³

Overall, that first visit by a Russian warship, during a tense political situation in the Gulf, proved a great success for Russian diplomacy. It had greater political and diplomatic consequences than later visits. The mere fact that a Russian warship had called at Gulf ports impressed both the Arabian and the Persian sides of the Gulf, as well as India, Britain and Germany. This is clear from the extensive press coverage and from reports of eyewitnesses.¹⁴

The visit of the Russian gunboat was followed by the first voyage of the Russian merchant ship Kornilov to the Gulf ports. Before the visit took place the Russian diplomat Ovseyenko, who had been in Basra since February 1901, reported that local merchants would welcome an opportunity to establish close trade links with Russia. He quoted local men of influence as saying:

What the British fear most of all is the ability and the inborn gift of your countrymen quickly to befriend and win over the indigenous people they meet. The British have been living among us for decades and are still foreigners. But your seamen, even though their stay with us was short, have managed to win all our sympathies.¹⁵

Naturally the British tried to hinder Russian trade, which threatened their own commercial and transport monopoly. They kept telling local officials that the Kornilov would bring a group of Russian officers who, together with those that had already arrived from Persia by land, would try to seize Basra. And they tried to convince Basra’s businessmen that they were running a great risk in trusting their goods to the Russian ship, which they described as decrepit.

From 3 February to 11 May 1901 the merchantman Kornilov of the Russian Steamship and Trade Company visited Jeddah, Muscat, Jask, Bandar Abbas, Bandar-e Lengeh, Bushehr, Muhammerah and Basra.¹⁶

This was the situation in the Gulf when a new four-funnel cruiser, the Varyag, appeared there after meeting the Kornilov at the port of Aden as she headed home. More than 18 months had passed since the Gilyak’s visit, and the British had spread rumours that they had forbidden Russian warships to enter the Gulf.¹⁷ In November–December 1901 the Varyag visited Muscat, Bushehr, Kuwait, Bandar-e Lengeh and Bandar Abbas.¹⁸

The Varyag arrived at the height of the Kuwaiti crisis. A letter from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamzdorf, indicated once more that ‘Russia had no aggressive intentions in the region and sought no territorial acquisition.’¹⁹ The purpose of the Varyag’s visit was to investigate the real state of affairs in the Gulf. Britain and Turkey had signed an agreement preserving the status quo in Kuwait, which was becoming increasingly important as the projected terminus of the Baghdad Railway. All this was clear from the instructions that the Ministry of the Navy and the Foreign Ministry jointly issued to the Varyag’s captain. The significance Russia attached to the visit was so great that a telegram was sent by Tsar Nicholas II on the ship’s departure,²⁰ and the route remained top secret. Even the ship’s officers were not told where they were going until the Varyag left Aden. Only Captain B. I. Behr and his first mate, Y. K. Kraft, knew the vessel’s route.

Shortly before the Varyag arrived Russian Consulates were opened in Basra and Bushehr, another indication that the region was commanding Russia’s close attention.²¹

Kuwait was once more the most important point in the programme of the Varyag’s Gulf visit. In Kuwait, Jaber, the son of Mubarak, boarded the cruiser bearing gifts. He explained that Mubarak and 3,000 troops were in Jahra, 15 miles away, anticipating a Rashidid attack. The Russian representative in Bushehr, Ovseyenko, and the ship’s officers went to Jahra, where they received a cordial welcome. They inspected the troops and watched an exhibition of military dancing and stunt riding.²²

Mubarak said that he would be happy to see as many Russian ships in the Kuwaiti roadsteads as possible. And if Kuwait was in trouble, he added, he would turn to the Russians for help. The officers found Mubarak’s troops well trained, even though there were no foreign instructors in the camp. The Bedouin warriors had been taught to dig trenches and had been trained in naval gunnery aboard the British cruiser Pomona.

The Varyag’s visit had great political significance. Mubarak refused to brief the British about his discussions with Behr and Ovseyenko. Rumours spread in the Gulf that he intended to lower the British flag on Cape Arzi and hoist the Turkish flag instead. Ovseyenko reported that the Varyag had commanded considerable attention in the various Gulf ports it visited:

It immediately drew keen interest and signs of friendship from local people. The impressive dimensions of the ship and its majestic appearance; the luxurious, clean and neat interior; the powerful electric lights; the huge guns; the brass band, unheard of in the Gulf; the various modern technical appliances; the crew’s strength; the freedom to examine the ship which the captain allowed on my advice; and finally the Russian sailors’ affability and politeness – all this charmed the visitors. It fuelled endless discussions in the various Gulf ports, even after the cruiser had left. … There was much talk about the Russian cruiser not only in the Persian ports but also in those on the Arabian Coast. … Rumours about a Russian cruiser in the Gulf reached Shiraz and Isfahan.²³

Among the most interesting archive material on the Gulf we have to mention the letters of the Russian zoologist N. V. Bogoyavlensky, sent to the Russian Consulate General in Bushehr. Bogoyavlensky was doing research in the Gulf area for Moscow University’s Society of Lovers of Natural Science, Anthropology and Ethnography. He visited Muhammerah, Kuwait, Bahrain and Muscat.²⁴ Unfortunately, up to now I have been unable to find the scientific report of this scholar, which he had to present to Moscow University. At around this time a series of books by Russian zoologists, naturalists and travellers were published in Moscow and St Petersburg, but among them there is no book by Bogoyavlensky. But what we should in any event note here is that the possibility of his raising the necessary funds for his scientific mission to the Gulf area was connected with the intense contemporary Russian political interest in the area. This interest was vividly expressed by M. P. Fyodorov in his semi-official work The Rivalry of Trade Interests in the East, published in 1903.

In late April 1902, Bogoyavlensky arrived in Bahrain with a letter of recommendation to Sheikh Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab. He spent three weeks on the island, where the Sheikh gave him a very cordial reception. When the British Consul, Hopkins, wanted the Bahrain Customs to examine the Russian traveller’s luggage, the Sheikh in person intervened forcefully to prevent this.

Arab leaders used Bogoyavlensky both as a source of information about Russia, its military power, and local and international politics and as a channel whereby to deliver important information to the Russians. Copies of Bogoyavlensky’s letters were circulated in Russia among the naval, military and political authorities responsible for developing Russian policy in the region.

The Russian zoologist notes the remark of Sheikh Muhammad that the appearance of the Varyag had given the Arabs the backing and encouragement needed to build up their opposition to Britain. Muhammad wanted to know why Russia could not leave the Varyag permanently in the Gulf. No ship of that size had ever called at the Gulf ports before. Muhammad told Bogoyavlensky that after the Varyag’s visit ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Faisal, the father of the founder of Saudi Arabia, had given him a letter intended for Ovseyenko, the Russian Consul in Bushehr. The Sheikh had kept that letter, and gave it to Bogoyavlensky. The meeting of the Russian consul in Bushehr with ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Faisal meant that the Saudis were no longer limited to British contacts alone, and now felt free to contact any of the powers.²⁵

Muhammad arranged for Bogoyavlensky to meet the Ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa, who also received him cordially and gave him a letter for Ovseyenko. Bogoyavlensky was received equally warmly in Muhammerah, where Sheikh Hazaal, who said he was a great friend of the Russians, invited him to stay at his palace. Hazaal’s secretary showed Bogoyavlensky another palace that the Sheikh had had built according to a plan drawn up by a Russian, S. N. Syromyatnikov (see below). When he left, Hazaal sent an escort with him to Kuwait.

In Kuwait, Jaber, Mubarak’s elder son, received Bogoyavlensky, and immediately sent a man to fetch the Sheikh to the city. Mubarak came at once, greeted the Russian scientist, and had a long discussion with him. He said, ‘I believe the Russians are friends. I am happy to play host to them. I am always ready to do everything I can for them. Please convey to Ovseyenko, whom I consider a brother, my greetings and my wish to correspond with him.’

The reception Bogoyavlensky was given in Muscat in early July 1902 was just as warm. In his letters the Russian scientist concluded that for the Arab population on the Gulf coast ‘the attraction of Russia as a power was great’.

The political situation clearly required the presence of a Russian vessel in the Gulf. The construction of a special gunboat to be stationed there was discussed and approved, and another first-class ship, the Askold, was sent to the Gulf in November and December 1902. This five-funnel cruiser with a crew of 580 visited Muscat, Bushehr, Kuwait and Bandar Abbas.²⁶

Among the results of her visit one has to mention the important talks that were once more held in Kuwait between Mubarak and the Russian Consul in Basra, A. Adamov, who was on board the Askold.²⁷ A report by Captain Reizenstein contains a detailed description of the political situation surrounding Kuwait, its port and numerous shipyards, and its fleet of 1,000 ships and the Sheikh’s white yacht, which resembled a medieval caravel. Jaber, his son Ahmed, and little Mama-Doli went aboard, and there were friendly discussions.²⁸

The Russian cruiser made a great impression in the Gulf. Hundreds of people visited it and enjoyed the hospitality and simplicity of the Russian officers, who made quite a contrast with the usually arrogant British.

The documents concerning the joint visit to the Gulf of two cruisers, the Russian Boyarin and the French Infernet, in February and March 1903 are especially interesting.²⁹ They visited Muscat, Bushehr, Kuwait, Bandar-e Lengeh, Bandar Abbas and Muscat once more. The allies both wanted to demonstrate their unity and the power of their bipartite alliance to their key enemy in the region, Britain, as well as to Iran, Turkey and the Arab sheikhs of the coastal territories.

But the two allies had different reasons for wanting this demonstration. For Tsarist Russia the Gulf was important in the context of its Turkish and Persian policy and British–Russian differences in this sector. France viewed the visit, first and foremost, in the context of the British–French conflict over Muscat, which had recently flared up again. The Kuwaiti question, too, played a major role for both allies; but again their positions were very different. France had invested heavily in the German Baghdad Railway project, which needed to have its terminus in Kuwait if it were to be profitable. But this would be possible only if Turkey continued to rule Kuwait. And that is why the French clashed with the British, who were seeking to impose a protectorate over Kuwait.

Russia opposed the project altogether, and wanted Kuwait to remain independent, and the Saudis to win and the Rashidids to be defeated in Arabia. In this respect Russian policy was at odds with those of Germany, France and Britain. Britain, it turned out later, had agreed to the railway project provided that Britain itself controlled the southern section within the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the French feared increased Russian influence in the Gulf. This is clear from documents showing that France repeatedly denied Russian ships the use of her coal-bunkering facility in Muscat.³⁰

Captain Sarychev of the Boyarin had visited the Gulf ports aboard the gunboat Gilyak, and was able to see how the situation had changed between 1899 and 1903. When the Russian ship arrived in Kuwait on 5 March it received a really cordial welcome. Mubarak’s second son, Sabah, and his nephew, Ahmed b. Jaber, came on board. The Russian officers were greeted on shore by Mubarak himself in formal dress; he received them twice, and also paid a return visit to the ship.

The Russian officers also paid two visits to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Saud, newly arrived from Riyadh. They were well received, and his two brothers, Muhammad and Saad, paid return visits to the ships. The 1902 Riyadh triumph of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz introduced to the Arabian political scene a figure of great stature and unique political intuition. His meetings with Russians were a clear attempt to find another external force that could help him in his struggle with the Rashidids and their powerful ally, Ottoman Turkey.

The Captain’s report carries a detailed description of the festivities arranged in Kuwait shortly before the arrival of the Boyarin and the Infernet to mark ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s victory over Ibn Rashid near Riyadh. In conversations with the officers, the Saudis complained that the Turks were secretly helping supporters of Ibn Rashid. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz emphasized that, as long as Arabia was in the hands of strong sheikhs, any railway, either to Kuwait or to the other suitable port of Jahra, was out of the question. Mubarak reaffirmed his hostility towards the Baghdad Railway project. When he was asked what he thought of British plans to build a road from Port Said to Kuwait, he replied diplomatically that he would support them if it were a joint venture between Russia, Britain and France, a stipulation that he was well aware could never be met.

Captain Sarychev explained in his report the origin of the alliance between Mubarak and the Saudis: if the Turks defeated the Saudis, they would, with Ibn Rashid’s help, move on to Kuwait. The day the cruiser left, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz went to battle with provisions and with 1,400 warriors as reinforcements from Mubarak.³¹ The Russians were witnesses of the opening of that summer–autumn campaign of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the struggle for Sudair province, which resulted in the Rashidids’ being dislodged from the regions south of Kasim.

These documents from the Navy’s Central Archives include exciting and unique documentary evidence about this short but very important period in Russian–Arab relations. Russian policy at that time worked also in the interest of the people of the Gulf, who were pressing for their independence. And communication with the Russian officers was easy. So all this helped Russia to build up its influence in the region.

The Arab rulers of the coastal regions had at first hoped that Britain would help them to end their dependence on Turkey or Persia; but they soon realized that British help would lead to a similar dependence. The appearance of Russian ships, Russia’s vigorous policy in the Gulf area, the opening of Russian consular missions and Britain’s obvious irritation all showed the Arabs that Russia could be an ally in their bid to hold back British and Ottoman penetration of the region. The Arabs began to look north toward Russia, and to make use of these contacts in their diplomatic struggle against London.³² From the other side, the politicians of St Petersburg, feeling the rise of Russian influence in the region, made several steps to capitalize on the situation.

Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovitch, the brother-in-law of Tsar Nicholas II, and a group of his creatures who were strategically placed in important military, navy and state institutions, such as Bezobrazov and Admiral Abaza, were the real ‘engine’ of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, not only in the Far East, but also in the Gulf region. The counteraction of Great Britain, America and Japan against Russian penetration in the Far East made the future of Port Arthur, the Russian naval base in China, very uncertain; and the alliance between Ottoman Turkey and Germany carried with it the threat of the closure of the Black Sea straits to Russian shipping. In such a situation the construction of a railway from the Russian frontiers to one of the Gulf ports through Persian territory, where the position of Russia was now very strong, seemed to Alexander Mikhailovitch and his party the logical conclusion to the century-long Russian drive to secure a ‘warm water port’. In his letters to Nicholas II the Grand Duke did his best to persuade the Tsar to interfere in the politics of the Gulf. The main opponents of Alexander Mikhailovitch, Count Witte, Lamzdorf, and Kuropatkin, the Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs and War respectively, were at that time unable to neutralize the Grand Duke’s influence upon the Tsar.

In April 1900 the Russian Finance Minister S. Y. Witte had to submit a ‘most humble memorandum’ to emphasize the need to establish direct shipping links between Russia’s ports on the Black Sea coast and the Arabian Gulf. To examine Gulf ports and adjacent markets, a ‘secret expedition’ was sent out, comprising S. N. Syromyatnikov, accompanied by Staff Captain PellenBehrg of the Pavlovsk Guards’ Regiment, and Bekir Gamazov, an Ossete. In reality it was Alexander Mikhailovitch who initiated the secret mission of Syromyatnikov. The latter, who is mentioned in the archive documents as the author (!) of the project of the palace of Sheikh Hazaal of Muhammerah, was a remarkable personality – a St Petersburg University Candidate of Law, a writer, a well-known journalist with two pen-names, ‘Sigma’ and ‘Normansky’, and, at one time, Editor-in-Chief of the official government paper Rossiya. Syromyatnikov was an adventurer by nature. He knew many courtiers and financiers, repeatedly undertook secret missions (in Korea, for instance), and was instrumental in setting up the East Asian Industrial Company, for which the Tsar awarded him the Order of St Anna, Third Degree, and presented him with an imperial gift.³³ His Korean expedition had also been inspired and organized by Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovitch.

The behaviour in the Gulf ports of Syromyatnikov, a known adherent of undiplomatically vociferous groups that espoused a high-risk colonialist policy, provoked the indignation of Russian diplomats. In November 1900 he returned to Russia and was received by Grand Prince Alexander Mikhailovitch and S. Y. Witte. On the basis of his report it was decided that the Russian Steamship and Trade Company would set up a commercial shipping line between Odessa and the Gulf ports, and that the project would receive a hefty government subsidy.

Syromyatnikov was asked to produce a ‘Practical Persian Gulf Guidebook’, for which he was even paid in advance. He worked on the book in St Petersburg and travelled to London. But for various reasons, including the Russo-Japanese War, only two chapters were published – ‘The Persian Gulf and World History’ and ‘The Dimensions of the Persian Gulf’. These were produced in St Petersburg in 1907 as a booklet entitled ‘Persian Gulf Sketches’.

These two chapters suggest that Syromyatnikov intended to write a detailed paper, with an argument referring back as far as ancient Assyria to show the importance of the Gulf for world trade and Russia’s need to establish a presence in that region.³⁴ At first the Gulf area attracted the aggressively colonialist circles in Russia politically and strategically, rather than economically. But the establishment of Russia’s virtual monopoly over Northern Persia, its successful movement further south, and an unprecedented period of economic growth revealed the great significance of the Gulf for Russian economic interests as well.³⁵

The Parts of Arabia and the Gulf Region under the Influence of the Ottoman Empire, Russia’s Old Military Adversary in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Whole of the Middle East

The construction of the Baghdad railway made Baghdad, Basra and Mosul wilayets, the territory of the 6th Turkish army corps, the closest vulnerable rearward area of the Ottoman armies that were concentrated along the Russian frontiers. That is why the Headquarters of the Transcaucasian Military District decided to send one of their military agents to the region. Captain of Artillery Boris Shelkovnikov was one of the best candidates for such a mission, being an honorary member of the Archaeological Institute and a full member of the Imperial Geographic Society. So his mission was presented as a scholarly one (a common practice in those times, cf. A. Musil, Dr D. Hogarth, and the German archaeologists). In September 1902 he left his military papers in the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, and in Port Said boarded the cruiser Askold together with his wife. Since the Askold was on a top-secret mission and Shelkovnikov had no military papers, Captain Reizenstein said he could only take him to Aden. But later, after receiving permission from St Petersburg, the captain did in fact take him on to the Gulf.

By May 1903 Shelkovnikov had visited Bushehr, Al-Faw (Fao), and Muhammerah, and passed up the Shatt al-Arab and the Tigris via Basra, Al Qurnah, Al ‘Amarah and Al Kut (Kut-al-Imara) to Baghdad, Samarra, and Tikrit; had then gone on to Altin-Köprü, Kirkuk, Daquq (Tauq), Tuz-Khurmatu, Kifri, Khanaqin, Al Miqdadiyah (Shahraban), and Baqubah, so returning to Baghdad once more; and had then journeyed south to Al Musayyib, Karbala and Najaf. On his return to Russia he prepared a report on his mission. A limited number of copies of his report were published by the Headquarters of the Transcaucasian Military District in Tiflis in 1904, marked ‘Secret’.³⁶

The report of Shelkovnikov supplies us with more than just unique military information on the stationing of the various detachments of the Ottoman 6th corps. The author describes in detail his itinerary, the political and religious situation in Mesopotamia and the Gulf region, the Baghdad railway problem, the postures and positions of the great powers and the activities of their official representatives. Many pages are devoted to the oilfields in Qasr-e-Shirin³⁷ and the problems of agriculture in the region. All this makes the work of Shelkovnikov an important historical source.³⁸

Arabia as the Motherland of Islam, Site of the Holy Cities and Pilgrimage Destinations of the Religion of Millions of Citizens of the Russian Empire

The second part of the nineteenth century is the period of the sharpest rise in Russian influence in the Middle East and Central Asia; and in particular the year 1898 was marked by the official cession of Western Turkestan to Russia. Together with the citizens of the dependent emirates of Khiva and Bukhara, the number of Muslim citizens of Russia had now reached 16 millions. Various economic and political moves by the central government secured for the time being the loyalty of the local population; but a chain of riots (1872 – Kara-Su; 1892 – Tashkent; 1898 – Andijan) characterized by the chanting of religious slogans showed the authorities the necessity of a proper analysis of the religious situation. This investigation uncovered the important role played by Ottoman agitators, who brought not only to Central Asia and the Urals, but also to the Volga region and the Crimea too the ideas of panislamism and panturkism.³⁹ The alliance of Ottoman Turkey with Germany and the attempts of the latter to play the ‘Islamic card’ against Russia and Britain made the danger of panislamic and panturkish propaganda even more pressing. It was assumed that one of the main sources of the spread of anti-Russian propaganda was the tradition of hajj (around ten thousand Russian citizens visited Makkah and Madinah annually). As a result, in 1898 the decision was taken to send to Makkah a Russian intelligence officer of Muslim origin, and it was Staff Captain ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Davletshin who was chosen for this mission.

On his return to Russia he prepared a special report on his mission. A limited number of copies of this report were published by General Headquarters in 1899, marked ‘Secret’.⁴⁰ The analysis of Davletshin showed that the danger of the spreading by hajjis of panturkish and panislamic ideas had been overestimated, and later he took an active part in the liberalization of the Russian legislation governing the practice of hajj.⁴¹ Davletshin’s report is an interesting source on the whole spectrum of hajj-related problems: the itineraries of hajjis, the organization of the hajj in the different regions of the Russian Empire, hajj practices in Arabia, the situation in relation to the spread of epidemics,⁴² security problems, and so on.

As we have seen, therefore, the Russian archives contain a corpus of documents of prime interest. Intelligence officers were sent to the region in the guise of scientists and pilgrims; the letters home of Russian scientists from the region are reminiscent of those of political agents; ships’ captains’ reports give all the political information first, and only accord navigational information second place. In general, the documents reflect the complicated picture of the international struggle for control over Arabia and the Gulf region; successful attempts by local leaders to conduct an independent foreign policy; and the interconnection between internal affairs in the Muslim regions of Russia and the hajj problem.⁴³

These documents could be used as an important source for the reconstruction of the local history of Arabia and the Gulf states. To my mind such a histo