Saudi-Italian Relations

Since the Second World War

Dr. Vincenzo Strika

General Considerations :

To deal comprehensively with the topic indicated by the above-mentioned title would take a whole book, and at all events is both more difficult and more demanding than the paper I submitted to the International Conference on King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in 1985, in which I dealt only with the period between the two world wars.¹ Assembling the data for the later period is far more complicated. The documentary archives, the main source for contemporary history, are available to be consulted up to 1957: a regrettable terminal date, since it was precisely during the 1960s that Italy began to see a good rate of economic growth, and to try out new initiatives in its Middle Eastern policy. From 1945 to 1957 the archives provide only four scanty boxes of documents, which is very little when compared with the twenty-four dealing with the period from 1932 to 1941, while from 1957 to 1967 only a selection of telegrams is available. After that the information, when it concerns political issues, remains mostly secret, while the economic figures are taken from a variety of sources of uneven value. We are on firmer ground coming to the recent period, when the statistics become more accurate. The well-known Oriente Moderno chronicle might well fill some gaps: but unfortunately, lacking financial support, the chronicle ceased publication in 1979. More fortunate was Levante, the periodical of the Centro per le Relazioni Italo-Arabe (al-Markaz lil-‘alaqat al-Italiyyah-al-‘arabiyyah), which provides useful information, but not an organized chronicle as Oriente Moderno did. On the other hand, foreign scholars with a few exceptions have not found the subject so attractive as they did in pre-war circumstances.² Finally, we have the parliamentary papers: but Saudi–Italian relations never created issues of such high diplomatic tension as to be dealt with extensively in Parliament. Even in 1973, at the time of the oil embargo, the problem was focused on the Arab–Israeli conflict as a whole, and not on Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, I hope to be able to sketch in at least the most important aspects, paving the way for further information when the archive documents become available. Italy entered into full diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia with the Treaties of Friendship and Commerce of 1932, just a few months before the Kingdom took its present name. At that time Italy was a major power in the Red Sea; therefore her policy was conceived mainly in political terms, which usually led to the need for reaching some sort of compromise with British interests. Italians trained the first Saudi Air Force, and a small team of doctors was established in Jeddah. Italy helped the building of charitable institutions in Makkah and Madinah for pilgrims coming from the Italian colonies, chiefly Libya and Somaliland. However, trade relations remained very poor. This was partly as a result of the economic situation of the Kingdom, and partly of the lack of co-ordination among Italian policy-makers. Nonetheless, in the 1930s Italy was visited in 1932 by Prince Faisal, in 1934 by Fu’ad Hamza, and in 1935 by Prince Sa’ud.³ These promising relations were severed by the Second World War.

Before dealing with the aftermath of this some preliminary remarks must be made. The Second World War was a turning-point in the Arab world. It hastened the end of colonialism, and reduced Great Britain and France to the second rank among world powers. The rivalries between Great Britain and Italy in the Red Sea were long past. If any such rivalries persisted, they now occurred between Great Britain and France, or between both these powers and the United States. Nevertheless, the complete withdrawal of the colonial powers took more than two decades. Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan became independent in 1946, Libya in 1951, Somaliland in 1960, Kuwait in 1961, Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, Algeria in 1962, South Yemen in 1967, and Bahrain, the Emirates, Oman and Qatar in 1971. The last to go was Djibouti, the former French Somaliland, which became independent in 1977, joining the Arab League in the same year.

Consequently the Second World War brought positive changes in the Middle East, although the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 caused new wars and tensions, which more or less affected the entire region, and had negative repercussions, especially, on its economic development. The war brought great changes to Italy, too. The Fascist regime collapsed, and was replaced by a multi-party system, with a strong Communist Party, which was usually countered by coalition governments. When the war was over Italy had to choose between the two superpowers, which was not an easy matter, since the resistance movement had been led mostly by the left parties, which had their links with the Soviet Union. The choice went to the NATO alliance – a natural one: but it weakened Italian foreign policy, which up to the end of the 1970s was determined more by internal than by external considerations. A kind of bipolar system was established around the two main parties, the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party.

The natural consequence of this was to diminish the power of the smaller parties. Generally speaking, there was no Italian foreign policy in relation to the Arab states, especially in the Red Sea. If there was one, it focused at first on the traditional links with the Mediterranean Arab countries, until finally the tremendous importance of the Gulf shifted Italian attention to a region that had earlier been neglected. Italy entered the NATO Alliance in 1949, and later on in 1957 was among the signatories of the Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundations of the European Community, now the European Union. In the first place, Italian foreign policy had to take into account the United States, and to a lesser extent, Italy’s European partners. It should be remembered that Italy usually sided with the United States, with which it shared an interest in aiming at replacing the influence of the former major colonial powers. Italy therefore benefited from the long Algerian struggle for independence, as well as from the 1956 Suez Canal War, which for a while at the time of Fanfani’s government brought Italy to the fore. Of course, Italy’s aims were only economic, and remained such throughout the long period of the Cold War, and even for some time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, during the era of so-called ‘globalization’.

The War and its Aftermath :

From 1945 to 1956 Italian interests in Saudi Arabia were mostly based on what had been done before the war. Italy had neither the political strength to challenge, nor any interest in challenging, the overwhelming power of the United States. She was dependent for her reconstruction on US aid, and neither the economic situation, nor the parties, including those of the opposition, would permit a different policy. Nevertheless, at least for a while, and in certain aspects, there was a continuity between the pre-war and the post-war situations. The Italian diplomats usually dealt with the same persons; nor had Saudi Arabia changed overnight in a few years, though her economic and political influence was increasing more and more, and was now universally recognized. In December 1941 the Saudi authorities invited the members of the Italian Embassy to leave the country. The ambassador Silitti tried to delay the departure, but was obliged to leave in February 1942,⁴ at a time when the British were undergoing serious military setbacks. As a matter of fact, in April 1941 Great Britain had to quell the revolt of the ‘golden square’ generals in Iraq, and, fearing similar uprisings elsewhere, adopted a strong-arm policy against the Egyptian Government, while Syria and Lebanon were militarily occupied. From the Italian side relations were regarded as ‘suspended’ rather than severed. Saudi Arabia was an independent state, but surrounded by British interests during a period of great uncertainty as to the outcome of the war. Silitti returned to Italy through Iraq, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The report he submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals some interesting details, especially on the Saudi attitude towards the revolt in Iraq, which, of course, should not be over-emphasized, but which do show the commitment of the King to Arab Nationalism.⁵

Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940 only because Mussolini was convinced of the inevitability of a swift Axis victory. But the country was unprepared for a long war, as was proved by its defeat in Ethiopia in November 1941, where 300,000 Italian soldiers were captured. It is worth noting that some of these managed to cross into Saudi Arabia, and thereafter worked in the Kingdom for a long while.

Much more important was the campaign in North Africa, which went on, with ups and downs, from June 1940 to January 1943. When the allied forces landed in Italy, the bulk of the Italian Army was abroad, with prisoners in Ethiopia, North Africa, the Balkan peninsula, the Soviet Union, and even southern France. Sicily soon proved to be indefensible, and, after a few attempts to set up a resistance were over, Italy had no choice but to sign the armistice in September 1943. Unfortunately, the armistice did not end the war. The Germans crossed the border to face the Allies, while Mussolini was rescued by an audacious German expedition to the Gran Sasso mountain, just in time to form a republican government opposed to the royal government in the south. Italy was divided, and a guerrilla war began in the north against both Fascists and Germans – in sober truth, this was an out-and-out civil war.

I have mentioned these events, because they were to forge the political map of Italy after the war, and to affect her relations with Arab countries too: no sooner was the Second World War over than the ‘Cold War’ had begun. As to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom was still ruled by King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. On 1 March 1945 the Kingdom declared war on Germany, and participated in the San Francisco Conference, where, on behalf of the King, Prince Faisal delivered a speech.⁶ Although not directly affected by the war, Saudi Arabia could not avoid its consequences, and in particular the superpower confrontation, especially as evidenced by the aggressive Soviet attitude in Iran. However, Saudi Arabia never entered into a formal alliance with non-Muslim powers, as Turkey did, entering the NATO Alliance, and the Baghdad Pact in 1955. But the uncertain situation in Iran, and the creation of Soviet-supported governments in Mahabad and Azerbaijan, as well as the troubles during the Iranian Oil Crisis, also encouraged by the Soviets, led Saudi Arabia to side with the Western powers, though the Arab–Israeli conflict remained, of course, a major bone of contention with them.

Italy and Saudi Arabia resumed relations in 1947. The preliminary contacts took place through the Italian and Saudi embassies in Istanbul. The first Italian ambassador was Filippo Zappi, who arrived in Jeddah on 10 October 1947.⁷ The old generation of diplomats was gone: some had died during the war, and some had retired, especially among those experienced in Middle Eastern affairs. The only Oriental experience that Zappi had consisted in having worked in the Italian consulate in Tianjin in China. He presented his credentials to Crown Prince Sa’ud. The embassy was not however settled in its pre-war quarters, which now held the Syrian embassy. Only on 2 June 1961 did the Italian embassy shift to a more suitable building, which was linked to a newly built Cultural Centre, intended mostly for Italian workers.

The first move was to revive the treaty of friendship of 1932, which had been signed without a time-limit, whereas the terms of the commercial treaty, having had a validity of only ten years, had to be re-negotiated. These were the first political moves made by the new ambassador, albeit with understandably limited success.⁸

The continuity with the past is evidenced by the Ospizii per Pellegrini (‘Houses for Pilgrims’) in Makkah and Madinah. Both were charitable institutions. The first one was established in 1917, and according to its waqfiyyah was opened to all Maghribi pilgrims, not only Libyans. For want of necessary repairs it was closed during the war. The Madinah ‘House’ was established in 1937, and was used only by pilgrims coming from Italian colonies. Although established by Muslims, and therefore qualifying as a waqf, they had government support. After Libya attained her independence, in 1952, they were transferred to the Libyan administration. Italy continued to make some contributions to their upkeep up to 1958, mostly on account of the continuing Italian mandate in Somaliland.⁹ It is worth noting that the Italian community in Saudi Arabia increased during the war. Italians landed at Jeddah, especially, at the time of Rommel’s offensive against the Suez Canal. They had fled from Ethiopia bound for Egypt; but when Rommel was halted at El Alamein, they remained in Saudi Arabia. Some of them contributed to the Saudi Navy and Air Force. Philby remembers the hospitality given to the sailors, who were actually refugees from the Italian colonies¹⁰ – a hospitality that stirred up some problems with the British. Later on, especially after 1943, Italian personnel were engaged by ARAMCO and by the Saudi Government.¹¹ In ARAMCO they contributed to the Ras Tanura terminal. The Americans had also established an office in Asmara to engage Italian workers and technicians, and by 1953 their numbers had increased to around 2,000 persons.¹²

Another consequence of the war was the matter of the destroyers sunk some thirty miles off Jeddah. On the eve of the war Italy had a squadron of its navy in the Red Sea. When the British occupied the Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa, these ships had either to surrender or to be sunk. However, at the time of the Rommel offensive in 1942, three destroyers (Battisti, Tigre and Pantera) escaped from British control, bound for the northern part of the Red Sea; but before they got there, Rommel’s offensive was brought to a halt at El Alamein, and they were scuttled by their crews off Jeddah. Negotiations for the salvage of these ships started in 1949. Italy offered the ships to Saudi Arabia, on the conditions that the recovery and repairs should take place at Saudi expense, and the latter in an Italian shipyard. A Lebanese firm was interested in the matter too; but after years of negotiations it was abandoned. Neither side considered it a good deal. Nor was the situation any better in trade relations, which remained very poor. In 1950 Italian exports to Saudi Arabia totalled 600,000 It. lire, while Saudi exports to Italy, excluding oil, were worth 200,000 It. lire. Saudi Arabia established her first embassy in Italy in 1950.¹³ The first Saudi ambassador to Italy was appointed on 25 December 1950: Sheikh Muwaffaq al-Alusi, an Iraqi who had graduated in Paris, and was very close to Rashid al-Qailani, who at the time was living in Saudi Arabia. The embassy in Rome was established in the Grand Hotel. Alusi was followed by ‘Abd al-Rahman Khulaisi from 1961 to 1966, and then by Ahmad ‘Abd al-Jabbar from 1966 to 1977, and Khalid Nasir al-Turki from 1977 to 1995. The present ambassador is Prince Muhammad Ibn Nawaf Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz.

On 9 November 1953 King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz died. He was succeeded by King Sa’ud. On the death of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz we have some archive documents. Among the doctors who attended the King was an Italian, Dr Sofia, who reported how the king, although ill, at the slightest hint that his health was bettering resumed his daily work without neglecting his prayers, especially Friday prayers.¹⁴

The history of the Italian doctors in Saudi Arabia began before the First World War, in 1910, when a First Aid Station was established in Jeddah, mostly for pilgrims coming from Italian colonies: with ups and downs it became a small hospital, whose activities were enhanced after the 1932 agreements. The first doctors were Dr Brunelli and Dr De Pea. At the time there were in Jeddah only some Russian doctors and an old hospital, established by the Turks. In 1937, following the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Italian Hospital was placed under the Italian Embassy. After 1941, some doctors remained in Jeddah, while others joined them from Ethiopia when that country was occupied by the British.

The work of the Italian doctors was still highly appreciated after the war, although the situation had radically changed. They were no longer sent by the Italian Government, but rather invited by the Saudi one. Dr Vincenzo Di Meglio became an authority in the Maternity Department of the Jeddah Hospital. By 1953 there were in Saudi Arabia at least ten Italian doctors. Some of them worked in the Saudi Army.¹⁵ Others worked in ARAMCO.¹⁶

Since Saudi Arabia needed more specialist personnel in the medical field there was a long list of Italian, and mostly young, doctors who applied to enter the Kingdom; but the Saudi authorities understandably preferred only the mature ones. The reputation of the Italians in this field was so high that Professor Filippo Sofia, who was a specialist in tropical diseases, and Director of the Jeddah Hospital, was included in the team attending King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. While human and economic relations were thus improving, very little can be added on the subject of political relations. Italy and Saudi Arabia were both committed to the anti-communist bloc. It is therefore quite understandable how political relations were determined by this situation, and how, if there were any differences, they were usually settled before coming to the surface. Only in two specific cases did some differences emerge, namely, in respect of the final settlement in the former Italian colonies, and, especially, in attitudes towards the state of Israel.

Italy’s withdrawal from her colonies started long before the end of the war. Ethiopia, Somaliland and Eritrea were lost in 1941, and Libya in 1942–3. On 10 February 1947, by the signature of the treaty of peace in Paris, Italy renounced all her colonies. After the war Italy, by contrast with Great Britain and France, had no colonial interests, and became freer to re-establish her policy exclusively on an economic basis. The settlement of the former Italian colonies aroused problems only in Libya. After the withdrawal of Italian and German troops, a British administration was settled in Cyrenaica on 11 November 1942, and in Tripolitania on 15 December. In the meantime Fezzan was occupied by the French. Great Britain and France still considered it possible to keep at least a part of their colonial empires, a policy that was at odds with the US, which aimed at enhancing its markets in the British and French colonies. On the other hand, the Soviet Union too formed part of the commission to settle the Libyan issue, and was hoping for a victory of the Communist Party in the Italian elections, in which case Italy could act as a bridgehead to bring the Soviet Union into the Mediterranean.

There were partition plans: the best-known was the Bevin–Sforza agreement of 1949, so called from the names of the then British and Italian ministers of foreign affairs. If it had been implemented, Libya would have been divided into three mandates: one for Italy in Tripolitania, one for Great Britain in Cyrenaica, and one for France in Fezzan. The proposal failed by one vote to be approved at the UN General Assembly.¹⁷ The debate at the UN became very intricate: commissions were repeatedly sent to Libya, but eventually the British succeeded in getting the matter settled. Muhammad Idris al-Sanusi, who had lived in Cairo during the two world wars, first became the ruler of Cyrenaica, and later, on 21 November 1951, the General Assembly of the UN recommended the independence of Libya, and on 2 December 1952 Muhammad Idris became King of Libya.

During the negotiations, Italy aimed at keeping her interests in the country, a policy that created some difficulties with the Arab countries. The official policy of the Arab League was for a mandate in favour of the League itself. This attitude was commonly shared, although the differences between Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan were usually recognized, and some governments would have preferred to give the Sanusi Cyrenaica alone, which would therefore have left open an opportunity for Italy to receive a mandate in Tripolitania. This colonial policy obviously created some misunderstandings with the Arab League countries, but was overcome when Italy finally accepted the full independence of Libya, and was compensated by Arab support for the Italian mandate in Somaliland. As one of the leading Arab countries, Saudi Arabia attentively followed the situation, and although she acted according to the decisions of the Arab League, led by its Secretary ‘Azzam Bey,¹⁸ would have favoured an independent Tripolitania. She would also have preferred that Eritrea should not be joined to Ethiopia.¹⁹ Eritrea had been conquered by the British in 1941, and reminded under military administration up to 15 September 1952, after the General Assembly of the UN had recommended a federal union with Ethiopia. But after 20 May 1960 Eritrea became a simple Ethiopian province. Two years later an opposition movement made its appearance.

Any chapter dealing with an Arab country after the Second World War cannot avoid confronting the Arab–Israeli conflict, which was one of the major results of the war. It brought the confrontation of the superpowers to the Middle East, adding greatly to the region’s tensions and instability. Only in the famous Resolution 181 of the General Assembly of the UN did the United States and the Soviet Union agree on the partition plan for the Palestine mandate. After that the relations between the two superpowers rapidly deteriorated, and the Middle East and North Africa became as a result of their strategic and economic importance a major theatre of conflict, with the Soviet Union usually exploiting Arab–Israeli differences. The state of Israel was recognized in 1948 by both the United States and the Soviet Union, followed by the Western countries. The Arab League reacted with a boycott, of which Saudi Arabia was a major supporter; but as trade has its own ways and interests, some Italian firms were sometimes involved in trade deals with Israel, arousing the protests of the Saudi Government. The Italian attitude with respect to the state of Israel was formally dictated by Italy’s alliance with the United States, nor was this policy opposed up to 1956 by the Communist Party, since the Soviet Union too had recognized the Jewish state.

Before the war, the Fascist regime had had an ambivalent policy on the problem.²⁰ On the one hand, it had to take into account the Arab population of its colonies, and the political opportunities afforded by the growth in Arab nationalism; on the other, it could not neglect the economic importance of the Jewish communities all over the world, and especially of those that bordered the Mediterranean Sea. However, Fascism was never sympathetic to Zionism. There were deep incompatibilities between the two ideologies, both of which were strongly nationalistic. Nevertheless, the Italian Jewish community was well organized. Suffice it to say that an Italy–Palestine Association was instituted to support the Jewish cause. Even in the 1930s, when the racial laws were approved in Germany, Italy did nothing against the Jews. On the contrary, some of the refugees received got hospitality in Italy. There were in the party some Jews who were by far the greatest enemies of Zionism. In January 1936, at the time of the invasion of Ethiopia, it was an Italian Jew who suggested that the Jewish national home might be shifted to situate it among the Ethiopian Jewish community.²¹ The Fascist regime was especially sympathetic to the Jewish revisionist movement led by V. Jabotinski. All this helps one to understand how Italy came to have an ambivalent policy towards the Zionist movement. After the Peel Commission in 1937 and the well-known plan for the partition of the Palestine mandate, the Italian government took seriously into account the possibility of the creation of a Jewish state. Mussolini himself seems to have been among the supporters of an independent, albeit a small, Jewish state.

But at the same time, in the early 1930s, after the revolt in Libya had been quelled, Italy got in touch with some Arab nationalists, and Radio Bari began its propaganda against the British.²² Later on, after the appearance of the racial laws in September 1938, the Italian support for the Arab nationalist movements, usually anti-British (in Palestine and Iraq) and anti-French (in Syria, Lebanon and Tunisia), became stronger. Italy in 1938 favoured an independent Kuwait, too.

After the war Italy was usually sympathetic to the Arab cause, although on some key points a range of different views were advanced in the course of parliamentary debate. The left-wing parties, especially after the 1956 Suez War, were closer to the Arabs; but they had few opportunities of affecting foreign policy. On the other hand, some members of the Socialist Party were in touch with the Israeli Labour Party, both of these parties being attached to the Socialist International organization. The Christian Democrats, bearing much of the policy-making responsibilities, chose the middle way, while the Republicans, with their close links with the US Republicans, were the most sympathetic to the Israelis. All these attitudes emerged during the crucial periods of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

By the 1950s Italy, having recovered from the destruction of the war years, was able to re-establish some influence in the area with its receipt of the Somaliland mandate, which was not opposed by the independent Arab countries, namely those members of the Arab League that had the right to vote in the General Assembly. There were new chances to improve relations with the Arab countries, and with Saudi Arabia in particular.

In 1952 there took place the second visit of Prince Faisal to Italy, his first visit having been in 1933, just after the 1932 agreements were signed. Prince Faisal was the undisputed arbiter of Saudi foreign policy. He represented the Kingdom at the San Francisco Conference, and was a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause, even before the war, at which time he became a candidate for the kingship of a mooted Palestinian kingdom.²³ In April 1948, before the first Arab–Israeli war broke out, he presented to the UN on behalf of the Arab League a proposal for a mandate in Palestine entrusted to the League itself, and later was always a strong supporter of the economic boycott against Israel.²⁴ His 1952 visit was aimed at improving economic relations. He visited the Milan Fair, where he met the Italian President Luigi Einaudi.²⁵ It seems, however, that there were some political reasons for the visit, too. There was talk of a visit to the Pope, to canvass the Vatican’s support on the Palestine issue.

The visit of Prince Faisal would have paved the way for a meaningful improvement in Italian exports, had not Italy in March 1954 concluded a trade agreement with Israel that aroused the protests of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.²⁶ From the Arab angle the agreement was perceived as a means employed by Israel of evading the Arab boycott. The reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repudiated any responsibility for this, but the problems remained.²⁷

The Attempts at a New Policy after the Suez War :

The Middle East and North Africa are essential Italian interests owing to Italy’s traditional trade relations, her geostrategic position, and her marked dependence on overseas oil, and later gas, supplies. Hence Italy will always attempt to support the stability of the area, trying to enhance her presence there, which was limited by the war. The first opportunity for a ‘new way’ in Italian Middle Eastern policy is usually seen as associated with the Suez crisis of 1956, which is perhaps an improper starting-point; but if we consider that crisis’s importance and its aftermath, it may perhaps be accepted. The background of the war is well known; therefore I will focus only on some points that fall close to the central argument of this chapter.

In 1950 Saudi Arabia emerged as the second oil producer in the Middle East, immediately after Iran. In 1953 there was established ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), whose president, Enrico Mattei, was a man of great skill and managerial abilities who tried to change the 50–50 profit distribution formula used hitherto in the industry, only to be opposed by other oil companies.²⁸

The 1950s was also the period that saw a growing attention paid to the other Arab Gulf states, which, although not yet independent, were going to be more and more important in future. At the time, this area was under the jurisdiction of the Italian Embassy in Tehran; but the suggestion was now made of opening a consulate in Bassora, which would be closer to the Gulf.

Her geopolitical position made Italy a close partner with the Arab world – even closer than Great Britain, and France, the only states she might compete with. Undoubtedly, Italy had something to gain from siding with the US, whose policy aimed at enhancing their own economic penetration, and replacing the former colonial powers during the disintegration of their empires. Italy was even in a safer position than the US was, having had no responsibilities in the establishment of the Jewish state, as the US had had.²⁹

However, entrusting the Italian foreign policy in this area to the US was perceived as against the national interest, and as such was frequently opposed by the opposition parties.

In 1956 the ‘alliance’ among Great Britain, France and Israel was defeated, but both the US³⁰ and the Soviet Union, which greatly contributed to that defeat, were also regarded with suspicion by the Arabs. The 1956 was also the very year when Morocco and Tunisia gained their independence, so providing new opportunities for Italian trade, while France was still engaged in fighting the independence movement in Algeria.

All this opened up new prospects for Italian policy-makers. Italy officially took up a position against the nationalization of the Suez Canal, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs Martino declared on 2 October 1956; but on 30 October he strongly condemned the Israeli invasion, also thoroughly dissenting from the French and British moves. Italy adhered to the US initiatives in the Security Council. In a speech delivered in Parliament on 6 November Martino expressed his worries over the weakening effect on the power of the UN, where both France and Great Britain had the right of veto.³¹

The bloody Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt, and NATO’s silent response to it made it even clearer how the two superpowers’ essential spheres of influence were regarded as inviolable. Hence an active confrontation between them could only exist elsewhere, in the Middle East and in the Third World. With the declining power of Great Britain and France, Italy too tried to get a share of the action, since the Suez War was greatly resented in the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia took a strong position. On 11 November 1956 she severed relations with both Great Britain and France. An oil embargo was proclaimed, while Italy too became a target because of her trade agreement with Israel. The boycott was taken so seriously that the American Express branch in Dhahran was closed, because the firm also had a branch in Israel.

The Suez War in 1956 is usually regarded as a turning-point in the history of the Middle East. France and Great Britain definitively lost their influence, and the Soviet Union skilfully exploited the uncertainties of the United States, which, however, soon reacted (on 5 January 1957) with the Eisenhower Doctrine. The aftermath of the war made space for the Italian Government to assert itself in certain ways, mainly economically, and to develop a new policy towards the Arab countries. Italy improved her trade relations with them – a step that required a foreign policy that, if it was not supportive of the Arab cause, was at least more cautious with regard to Israel; and this was all the easier to implement, in that the US President Eisenhower, not having been elected with the help of the Jewish lobby, felt freer in his Middle East policy in this respect. For Italy the economic benefits were evident, nor they were hampered by the aftermath of the war, which boosted President Nasser’s charisma, as well as fostering his socio-political views and the influence of the Soviet Union in the area. Italy resented the expulsion of her nationals from Egypt, but relations remained good. On improving ties with a non-aligned country, such as Egypt was, both the government and the opposition parties found themselves in complete agreement.

King Faisal became king in 1964. His role was particularly important during the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars. During his government the Organization of the Islamic Conference was established in September 1969. The establishment of the Conference was closely related to the Arab–Israeli conflict. According to King Faisal the main enemies to be fought were Communism and Zionism. His firm attitude regarding Jerusalem is well known, and we will come back to it later.

At the time of the Six Days’ War in 1967, the Italian Government was led by Aldo Moro, with Fanfani as Minister of Foreign Affairs.³² Moro was among the more attentive of Italian politicians towards Middle Eastern problems. He usually distanced himself from US policy, as witness the difficult relations he almost always enjoyed with the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But his views were not shared by all parties. His somewhat accommodating policy towards the Communists was opposed by other parties, and found opponents even among his own Christian Democrats.

On 4 June 1967 Italy refused to comply with an Anglo-American request about a ‘declaration’ concerning the use of force to open navigation in the Tiran Strait. This was the first example of a deliberate opposition to US policy. In the new situation, relations with Saudi Arabia improved too. The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs ‘Omar al-Saqqaf paid an official visit to Italy in September 1968. Saudi students came to Italy, and in April 1971 Prince Khalid, at that time the General Director of Cultural Relations, officially visited Italy. Generally speaking, Italy benefited from the 1967 war, as France was also about to.

So the way was paved for the 1970s, an important period for the Arab world. Italy in the meantime had achieved the rank of a first-class industrial power, while Saudi Arabia had emerged as the undisputed leader of the Arab world. On the other hand, Italian foreign policy was undergoing some changes, especially over the Arab–Israeli conflict. There was a widespread conviction in the media that the conflict could not be brought to an end without taking the rights of the Arabs and the Palestinians seriously into account.

The 1970s began with the devaluation of the dollar, and with King Faisal in a position of leadership in the Arab world as a whole and in the conflict with Israel in particular. Saudi Arabia played a key role in the Ramadan War of 1973, being the main supporter of the trade embargo, which was repeatedly announced before the war,³³ thus showing the commitment of the King to the Palestinian cause.

During his visit to Israel in March 1971,³⁴ Moro, at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the European Community should be more involved, and should be consulted in the peace process. Moro appreciated the so-called Rogers Plan, one of the most sympathetic to the Arabs ever formulated by US policy-makers. Moro went even further in trying to mediate between Israel and the Arab States.

The 1970s may be considered the ‘golden age’ of the relations between the two countries. In February 1973 the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giuseppe Medici, during a visit to Riyadh, signed an agreement on cultural, technical and scientific co-operation. In June 1973 King Faisal paid his third visit to Italy.³⁵ He met President Giovanni Leone. A visit to the Pope was also planned, but did not occur. If it had happened, it would probably have been concerned with the Jerusalem issue. The attitude of the King on this matter is well known, and was to become the main source of friction between Saudi Arabia and the US. Rejecting the old internationalization formula, going back to the Sykes–Picot agreement, and General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947, King Faisal suggested an administration shared by the three monotheistic religions. The Old City of Jerusalem had to be restored to a Palestinian or a Jordanian authority. Even in a message sent to the Italian President Saragat in June 1967 King Faisal expressed his concerns over Jerusalem.³⁶

Perhaps the most tangible result of the visit was the project for the Islamic Centre and Mosque at Rome, which was approved during the visit. King Faisal personally contributed with $7 million. The Rome municipality made a donation of 30,000 square kilometres of land.³⁷ The idea of building of a mosque in Rome has had a long history. It may be traced back to the pre-war period, and specifically the 1930s, when Italy tried to improve her relations with the Arab countries. At that time the project was opposed by the Vatican. Even after 1974 the construction was not an easy matter, since there were still environmental problems, which were usually overcome by higher authorities, and sometimes by the Government itself. The attitude of the Church changed after the Second Vatican Council, with the establishment of a Secretariat for Non-Christian Communities, whose president was Cardinal Pignedoli, who met King Faisal in Riyadh in 1974. In October 1974 a high-level meeting took place in the Vatican, with a Muslim delegation led by the Saudi Minister of Justice Mohammed al-Harkani. The dialogue between Christianity and Islam was officially opened, and probably there were high-level understandings between King Faisal and Pope Paul VI.³⁸

The visit of King Faisal paved the way for a series of visits and diplomatic activities. So when the Ramadan War broke out in 1973 Italy was already on the way to improving her relations with Saudi Arabia. This unexpected war produced the usual splits among the political parties. The Republicans and the Social Democrats were strongly critical of Egypt and Syria. By contrast Moro, at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported a just peace based on Security Council Resolution 242. The representatives of the European Community met in Brussels. After the Arab Summit in Algiers from 26 to 29 November 1973, Italy participated in the European Summit in Copenhagen on 14 December 1973. This summit officially opened the Euro-Arab Dialogue. In a speech to Parliament on 23 January 1974 Moro spoke about a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. During his visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Emirates, and Kuwait Moro emphasized the need for a global resolution, an initiative that was opposed by some parties, which would have preferred to restrict Italian policy to purely economic relations. Italy was among the countries that banned US planes carrying supplies to Israel from flying over their territories. The Ramadan War and the subsequent embargo played their expected part in this matter. However, pro-Arab declarations in Parliament and the attitude of the media were always compromised by the international situation, especially the Cold War and the alliance with the US. Italy, for instance, in the late 1970s accepted US missiles on her territory, but at the time of the Venice Declaration of June 1980 was among the supporters of the self-determination of the Palestinian people. The 1970s ended with a whole series of dramatic events: the Camp David Agreement, the Revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the beginning of the war between Iraq and Iran. Nevertheless, this period too saw a further improvement in Italo-Saudi relations.

I will here just mention the visit to Saudi Arabia by the Italian President Giovanni Leone, from 2–5 March 1975, whose most important result was the signature of an agreement on economic, industrial and technical co-operation that is still in force. In the final declaration, the Italian President, who was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Rumor, again supported Security Council Resolution 242 as the only basis on which to solve the Arab–Israeli conflict. In January 1977 the Minister of Foreign Trade Ossola was in Riyadh, preparing for the official visit of the Prime Minister G. Andreotti and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fanfani in August 1977, which opened new perspectives of economic co-operation. In May 1979 a delegation led by Crown Prince Fahd, at the time Deputy Prime Minister, visited Italy, followed in December 1980 by the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sa’ud al-Faisal, while in January the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Colombo was in Riyadh. It became customary for the highest representatives of the