King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud and Amin al-Rihani:

Some Notes on al-Rihani’s Anglo-American Diplomacy

Dr. Geoffrey P. Nash

The Arab-American traveller and writer, Amin al-Rihani, did much to introduce His Majesty King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud to an American audience consisting of American political leaders and diplomats, as well as of interested general readers. In this chapter I wish to review some areas in which al-Rihani’s American connections were helpful to the newly emerging state of Saudi Arabia, not only in the general sense mentioned above, but also in specific economic and diplomatic contexts as well.

The general outline of al-Rihani’s contact with the future King of Saudi Arabia is of course to be found in Arabic in his Muluk al-Arab (1926) and in English in the form of his account, Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia: His People and His Land (1928). Parts of this appeared as early as 1926 in the magazine Asia, published in New York.¹ As I am interested here mainly in al-Rihani’s mediation of Arab perspectives to a Western audience and readership, I shall make reference to his writings in English.

An early reviewer of Ibn Saud: His People and His Land remarked:

[Rihani’s] vivid exposition of ... the rule of Ibn Saud is convincing and will interest even those who are quite unversed in the religion and politics of Arabia; while the initiated will find that a desert kingdom, a desert people, a desert capital and a desert king, of whom they have been only academically aware, have been made homely and lifelike for them by this modest, humorous traveller.²

Amin al-Rihani was unique in that he was able to appreciate King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz through both Western and Arab eyes at one and the same time. Of course, as an Arab, he was privileged above the first Westerners who met King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, not only because his Arabic was mostly better than theirs was, but because his perspectives were Arab, his allegiances were Arab, and his heart was Arab. Then again, he knew the mind of the West, and what the Western traveller had already written about the deserts of Central Arabia, or the Western Orientalist had said about The Arabian Nights or Abu’l-Ala al-Ma’arri. He had read Richard Burton and Charles Doughty, Edward Lane and Professors von Kremer and Margoliouth, and he made reference to their works in his own writings. This made al-Rihani doubly privileged, for through this specialization he was able to further his beloved cause – that of the Arabs – in the eyes of the Westerner. And this proved to be not just a romantic exercise: it actually brought the Arabs tangible benefits, as well as bringing their greatest living leader to the attention of America.

Before he left for Arabia on his momentous journey of 1922–3, al-Rihani informed the American Under-Secretary of State Henry P. Fletcher of his intentions, emphasizing that he was a friend of Arabia who desired ‘to see her go forward hand in hand with European civilization’. As became customary for him, he informed the official that he had ‘no axe to grind – except the axe of civilization’. I think that we must take al-Rihani at his word; that is, we must respect his honesty. There is no evidence to suggest he had any ulterior motive pertaining to personal gain. Nor were his politics anything but open and above board. Such reports as he sent to American agencies concerning his visits to the Arab leaders in Arabia were inimical neither to their interests, nor of course to American interests. In his letter he promised ‘to furnish a report on Arabia and later write a book’, and he did both.³ And in the Yemen, al-Rihani told the Imam Yahya almost precisely what he had told Fletcher: ‘I am not a foreigner: I am of you. I have nothing to do with the English Government; I am not connected politically or commercially with anyone in America ... I am a self-appointed missionary for civilization. But my loyalty for the Arab cause has never been questioned.’⁴

It is also true that al-Rihani was impartial in respect of the Arab leaders he met on his journey. To each he accorded, in his writings, the respect that was their due. However, in the then Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies, al-Rihani recognized a leader of a different order. He summarized what he felt was the significance of this outstanding figure on the contemporary Arabian scene in a lecture he gave in America in July 1930:

Ibn Saoud was called by Mr Rihani the most important man in Arabia today. He is the strongest, and the wisest as a leader of men. He believes himself a divine instrument of regeneration in Arabia. Historians, even those outside the Arabic [sic] world, regard him as the greatest ruler of the Peninsular [sic] since the Prophet.

Mr. Rihani met Ibn Saud in the camp where the latter was negotiating with the representatives of Great Britain. The speaker described him as forthright, simple, and frank. In some conversations with him there, the King expressed the point of view toward progress, which Mr. Rihani believes is best for Arabia, and could be heeded with profit by America. Pointing to the British camp which they were approaching at a leisurely pace, Ibn Saud said, ‘Even though we walk slowly we are approaching civilization. Civilization is not going to run away from us.’

Ibn Saud, nevertheless, is the author of the greatest reform in the history of Arabia, an unprecedented change which is revolutionizing the country. Thirty years ago, the bulk of the population lived in nomadic tribes fighting each other. Ibn Saud has conquered most of these, and brought them under his benevolent rule. Under his influence they are giving up their tents and building houses of stone.⁵

In a report to Washington sent not long after his return from Arabia, al-Rihani expanded on the last point:

One of the big reforms which Ibn Saud has introduced into Najd are the hejar (sing. hajra), or new towns. He has made the bedu emigrate, so to speak, – hence the word hajra, emigration, – from the nomad state to the urban and agricultural life. Wherever there is water in Najd a new town has been built and settled by the bedu of some tribe, with the assistance, of course, of the Sultan. The bedu had been barbarous, did not know [their religion] in their nomad state, had neither roof nor ground they could call their own, and they cut each other’s throats in the gazu; now they have homes and cattle and land to cultivate – and they have above all the religion of Tawhid! That is a Najdi’s precious possession, is what the traveller often hears in Najd.⁶

Take, in addition to this, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s magnanimous treatment of his defeated enemies – ‘His Highness the Sultan, as the English address him, treats foes with unexampled generosity and goodness’ – and his wise taxation of his people – ‘The Sultan ... with paternal affection and wisdom – takes from him that hath and giveth to him that hath not’⁷ – and a most positive and accurate picture of the founder of Saudi Arabia is built up. Although it would take time to work through, this presentation of a hitherto largely unknown area to the Americans would eventually reap rewards.

I now wish to pass on to three specific instances in which al-Rihani’s diplomacy was directed toward the Americans and the British to the advancement of Saudi interests, and also, it should be said, in part to that of American and British interests too. Taken chronologically, these are as follows: (1) the question of the al-Hasa oil concession; (2) the Saudi point of view with regard to the tribes crossing the border with Iraq; and (3) the granting of United States recognition to the State of Saudi Arabia.

The Conference of Uqair and Subsequent Negotiations Concerning the al-Hasa Oil Concession ‘Had it not been for the fact that he backed the wrong man and persuaded an Arab king to do likewise, today the richest oilfields in the world would be in British rather than American hands.’⁸ This statement refers to the fact that al-Rihani encouraged ‘Abd al-‘Aziz to give the oil concession in al-Hasa to an independent company. This company subsequently relinquished the exploration rights in 1928, for them to be eventually taken up by the American company Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) in 1933.

However, it would be a distortion of al-Rihani’s role in the matter in question to imply that he was working for Western interests. We shall see from his own account that his main concern was to protect Saudi and Arab interests from the monopoly of any one outside power. Also, to suggest an anti-British and pro-American partisanship on his part would be incorrect in this case. His intervention was intended to free up rather than to restrict the development of resources in Arabia. Rihani’s account of the Conference of Uqair was quoted and summarized by Harry St. John (‘Abd-Allah) Philby in his book, Arabian Oil Ventures. He confirms that ‘Ameen Rihani ... had no specific interest in anything so commercial as oil, but was deeply concerned with the politics of the new post-war Arabia ... It was pure accident that brought him to the Hasa coast on the eve of a political conference, whose main business was the fixing of boundaries between the territories of Ibn Sa‘ud and various protégés of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf ...’. ⁹ Philby goes on to point out the deficiencies in two other accounts of the granting of the concession in al-Hasa, by Captain H. A. R. Dickson, who was present at Uqair, and by the British official, Stephen Longrigg. The substance of Philby’s criticism is that the two British sources omit or elide significant information – information provided by al-Rihani’s account, on which Philby draws heavily.¹⁰

Briefly, Rihani had travelled by steamer from Basra to Bahrain en route to Uqair. On board he made the acquaintance of Major Frank Holmes, a New Zealander, ‘formerly of the British navy and now of the General and Eastern Syndicate Limited of London’. Holmes had told al-Rihani he was travelling for his health; but his real purpose was to obtain the al-Hasa Concession for his syndicate. Later he appeared at Uqair, this time in the party headed by the British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox. But though he ate with the British, Holmes’s plans were not favoured by Cox, who, as a representative of the British Government, supported the rival Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which his government owned a 70 per cent interest. Cox ‘succeeded in getting the Sultan to postpone, at least, the giving of the Concession to Major Holmes till he had communicated with the Government in London’. Al-Rihani, for his part, convinced ‘Abd al-‘Aziz that it was ‘better to his interest to grant the Concession to an independent Company that has no connection with the British Government’.¹¹ Thanks to al-Rihani’s suggestion, and his encouragement of Holmes not to give up, the concession was eventually granted to the General and Eastern Syndicate. To ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, al-Rihani made his reasons for supporting Holmes quite clear:

Your Highness is a sovereign in your own land, and you have a right to give a concession to whatever company you please, so long as it is English. Your pact with the British Government does not bind you to accept the company they prefer. Here are two English companies, one of them practically owned by the British Government, while the other has nothing to do apparently with politics, is free from government interference, and you have a right to your own choice in the matter ... The least of politics with capital the better for Arabia. Concessions on a purely business basis and with a purely business motive, without any political tags to them ... these are best for the Arabs and for the English.¹²

Philby concludes: ‘The tenacity of both parties [i.e. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and Holmes] no doubt had something to do with the ultimate triumph, while some credit is doubtless due to Ameen Rihani for his consistent support of the project from the beginning.’ Al-Rihani, he adds, was ‘probably influenced in the main by considerations of a political character’; it was not in the best interests of the Arab State to give the concession to a company in which the British Government was a substantial shareholder. ‘So far as we know, his support of Major Holmes was entirely altruistic and inspired by a desire to promote the best interests of Ibn Sa’ud.’¹³

The Situation of the Tribes and the Border with Iraq:

The main purpose of the Uqair Conference, as stated above, was discussion of border security between Nejd and Iraq. A solution to this question was not easy to find, as it involved tribes’ crossing over areas of desert in which traditionally there had been no borders. While the British maintained that the incursions were all from the Saudi side, and required action of a specific kind, al-Rihani presented the Saudi view. He pointed out in a lecture to the British Central Asian Society, in November 1928, that the action of the British in building ‘a line of outposts along the border line’ was believed by the Saudis to be contrary to the Agreement of Muhammarah. His own conclusion was that there was justice in the Saudi claim that the posts contravened the treaty. But his main point was to acquaint his British hearers with the attitude towards political boundaries of the Bedouins of that period. ‘A Member of Parliament once asked the Colonial Secretary about the corridor across the desert from Transjordan to Iraq. We might as well speak of a corridor between our planet and Mars.’¹⁴ The Bedouin Arabs of the time only recognized possible boundary lines in certain landmarks, most importantly wells and areas of pasture. As a British historian has written:

While they were nominally intended to control tribal movements, the desert posts were really a tactical ploy, aimed at establishing a buffer zone to protect Iraq’s cities and strategic routes. Their effect, moreover, in interrupting the traditional payment of tribute, was to invite retribution upon the sheltering tribes. The RAF and the Iraq authorities had affected the traditional equilibrium of the desert.¹⁵

The tribes had long disputed possession of the wells in the areas in question and an easy solution was not to be found in the treaties made between the British and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz because the phrasing of the agreements was vague and imprecise. (Here al-Rihani quoted from the Arabic version of the protocol of Uqair.) As for the raiding, it was not all on one side. ‘There were raids and counter-raids, and there are many standing claims for restoration of plundered property and reparation on both sides.’ ‘Look,’ al-Rihani is saying to this elite British audience, among whom were important diplomats, ‘you cannot apply force against one side only and allow the other (your own) to go unpunished.’ The problem of the tribes raiding across the border with Iraq was complex, involving as it did ancient feuds, as well as pressing present needs. But with diplomacy and good will, and above all with better patrolling by the British on the Iraqi side, the matter might be resolved.¹⁶

In this instance we see al-Rihani aiding the Saudi side by representing its legitimate point of view to the colonial power that was pressuring it. His dual mastery of English and Arabic was a great advantage in this task, and it supplemented the efforts of the Saudi side, who were necessarily limited in their diplomatic resources at that time.

Al-Rihani and American Diplomatic Recognition of Saudi Arabia:

Full diplomatic recognition of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies was accorded by Britain in 1929. A British Minister was later sent to Jeddah to the Legation (recently upgraded from Consular-Agency status) in May 1930. By the end of 1930, five countries had legations in Jeddah: Britain and the Soviet Union (who were represented by Ministers) and the Netherlands, Iran and Turkey (who had Chargés d'Affaires). In October 1928, the Director General of Foreign Affairs at Makkah formally requested the United States of America to afford recognition. This it did in May 1931; but full diplomatic relations were only established later, in 1939. Amin al-Rihani’s efforts on the country’s behalf were significant, although it is difficult to establish how crucial they were in obtaining eventual United States recognition.

Al-Rihani made contacts with the American Government and American political leaders on the same basis as he opened relations with Arab leaders and governments, that is, as a private citizen. In 1917, he apprised former President Theodore Roosevelt of his opposition to Zionism; he met Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in September 1929 as part of a delegation of American Arabs to argue the same cause. Meanwhile, he also lectured on Arab topics to important American bodies like the Chautauqua Institute and the American Foreign Policy Association in 1929–30. Having opened lines with Stimson, he returned at least once more – in January 1931, for an interview that Stimson recorded in his diary as follows: ‘After Cabinet Meeting I received Mr Ameen Rihani, an American citizen of Arab descent, who came to ask for recognition of Ibn Saud, king of Nejd. He was a smooth-appearing gentleman who made a good argument.’¹⁷ Department of State, Division of Near Eastern Affairs records show that Stimson was expecting al-Rihani to raise the issue of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and that, in point of fact, the process of recognition was already well on the way to accomplishment.¹⁸ Indeed, barely three weeks after his meeting with al-Rihani, Stimson notes: ‘... went to the White House and took up with the President ... the recognition of the Kingdom of the Hedjaz [sic], King Ibn Saud. I explained to him the reasons for doing it, and he said to go ahead.’¹⁹ This raises the question as to how much groundwork had already been done to this end by friends of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, and whether Rihani had himself been engaged in this.

Chief among the advocates of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in America was the rich philanthropist and Arabophil, Charles R. Crane. Briefly American ambassador to China before the First World War, Crane had been a close friend of Woodrow Wilson. Indeed, he became an advocate of Wilson’s principles of the rights of smaller nations, and with Dr Henry C. King, headed the American commission that went to Syria in 1919 to test what the people themselves felt about the post-war settlement. He found that, if a mandate had to be established, most favoured America to be the mandatory authority. The United States had no firm interests in the Middle East at the time, and was not tainted with the brush of imperialism. While the American Government retreated into isolationism after Wilson’s presidency, Crane strengthened his links with the Arab world by visiting Jeddah in late 1926 (when he unfortunately did not meet King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz), proceeding to the Yemen early in 1927. He returned to Jeddah in late February 1931 with the experienced negotiator (formerly with the British Administration in Palestine) George Antonius. This was around the time that the United States Government had determined on recognition of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. His Majesty entertained Mr Crane, who afterwards met Philby. Crane discussed artesian wells with Philby, it being widely known that Crane was helping Imam Yahya to prospect for water in his territories. Crane offered to arrange for his engineer in the Yemen, Karl Twitchell, to come to Jeddah and size up the possibilities for boring in the area. (Twitchell did not find any artesian wells, but he did present geological notes to several oil companies, opening the way for the exploitation of Saudi oil by SOCAL.)²⁰

Crane’s efforts on behalf of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz were not only philanthropic, but almost certainly diplomatic too. He was a close acquaintance of Henry Stimson, whose diaries reveal frequent meetings between the two, and discussions on China and Japan on which Crane set himself up as an authority. Crane may well have advocated recognition of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz to Stimson. The American Government was in fact receiving encouragement to do just this from a number of sources, including Philby, who had suggested American arbitration between Britain and King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in 1929, and was an agent for SOCAL and the Ford Motor Company in Jeddah. In addition, the American Automobile Trade Commissioner for the Near East visited Jeddah in June 1930 on the request of the American Legation in Cairo, and ‘reported on the desirability of recognizing the kingdom’.²¹

What then is the significance of al-Rihani’s part in the growing impetus toward American recognition? Was he perhaps co-ordinating his efforts with some of the others – specifically with Crane and Antonius? Although Rihani certainly knew Crane, for whom he occasionally translated documents, there is no concrete evidence to suggest he was working directly with him on this matter. Rihani did go himself to Jeddah in summer 1931, and wrote back to the State Department a letter entirely consistent with the individualistic path he had trodden up until then in US–Arab affairs: ‘Here ... is a virgin market of great possibilities. I have done all I could to open it to American capital and enterprise. I myself, I repeat, have no axe to grind. Only an interest, purely sentimental, in my native country’s progress and in the enterprise of the country of my adoption – the two countries I love best.’²²

It is therefore safe to conclude that, as in so many matters concerning Arab interests of the time, Amin al-Rihani acted as a sympathetic unofficial ambassador for the Arabs. He preferred to work as an individual, perhaps because few organizations then existed to further the causes he held dear. With respect to recognition of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, it is clear that al-Rihani’s was one of a number of influential voices. His influence was important because of the esteem in which he was held by King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, and because of his links to the American Government, which should not, however, be over-emphasized. He may have worked in parallel with Crane and Antonius; but more conclusive evidence would be needed to establish a concerted action.

Conclusion :

I have argued in this chapter for a consistent thread running through Amin al-Rihani’s efforts on behalf of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and the emerging kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This was al-Rihani’s sympathetic but disinterested involvement in promoting recognition of the King and his territories before a Western, and specifically an American and British, political and diplomatic audience. I have suggested that al-Rihani worked mainly as an individual, and, aside from what he obtained from writing the best-seller Ibn Saoud of Arabia, without expectation of personal gain. At a moment in the Kingdom’s development when it needed all the expertise it could get, al-Rihani offered skills that were intelligent and productive, both in respect of diplomatic and political judgement and in their impetus towards commercial and economic growth. I have not touched on al-Rihani’s great poetic and artistic endowment, and the contribution he made to the Arabs’ cultural development, but that, indeed, is another story.

Notes

1. Rihani’s first article on ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was, ‘With the Kingliest King in Arabia: Ibn Saud’, Asia, 26 (1926): 668–74, 734–5, 760–7, 864–71, 974–81; the article was incorporated almost in its entirety into Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia: His People and His Land, London, 1928.

2. Theodosia Thompson, Review of Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia, The Bookman, April 1928, pp. 55–6.

3. Letter to Henry P. Fletcher, reprinted in Irfan Shahid, ‘Amin al-Rihani and King ‘Abdul-‘Aziz Ibn Saud,’ pp. 231–40, 238, in George N. Atiyeh and Ibrahim M. Oweiss (eds), Arab Civilisation, Challenges and Responses, Studies in Honor of Constantine K. Zurayk, Albany, NY, 1988.

4. Ameen Rihani, ‘Arabia: an Unbiased Survey,’ Journal of Central Asian Society, 16 (1929): 35–55, at p. 43.

5. ‘Three Kings in Arabia,’ report of a lecture by Rihani, Chautauquan Daily, 23 July 1930.

6. A ‘Report on Arabia’, dated Washington, 3 December 1923, in Ibrahim al-Rashid (ed.), Documents on the History of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 1, The Unification of Central Arabia Under Ibn Saud, 1909–1925, Salisbury, NC, 1976, pp. 113–37, at p. 130.

7. Ibid., pp. 125, 131.

8. Leonard Mosley, Power Play, Oil in the Middle East, Baltimore, MD, 1974, p. 51.

9. H. St. J. B. Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures, Washington, DC, 1964, p. 55.

10. H. A. R. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, London, 1949; S. H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Diplomacy, London, 1968.

11. al-Rashid (ed.), Documents on Saudi Arabia, Vol. 1, p. 135.

12. Ameen Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia.

13. Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures, pp. 59–60.

14. Rihani, ‘Unbiased Survey’, p. 49.

15. Clive Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925–1939, The Imperial Oasis, London, 1983, p. 105.

16. Rihani, ‘Unbiased Survey’, p. 50. See also Ameen Rihani, ‘Arabs and Arab Politics’, The Times (London), 11 December 1928.

17. Diaries of Henry L. Stimson, Yale University Library, 15, p. 44.

18. See Wallace Murray to Henry L. Stimson, 14 January 1931: ‘I would suggest that we instruct our Legation at Cairo to inform the Hejazi Representative at that capital that this Government is now in a position to give favourable consideration to the recognition of Ibn Saud ...’, in Ibrahim al-Rashid (ed.), Documents on the History of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 3, Establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Under Ibn Saud, 1928–1935, Salisbury, NC, 1976, p. 100.

19. Stimson, Diaries, 15, p. 81.

20. Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson, FO E1601/569/25, in British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, Vol. 7 Eastern Affairs, June 1930–June 1932, ed. Robin Bidwell, Cambridge, 1985, p. 145; K. S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, With an Account of the Development of Its Natural Resources, Princeton, NJ, 1947, pp. 148–50.

21. al-Rashid (ed.), Documents on Saudi Arabia, Vol. 3, pp. 105–6.

22. Ibid., p. 117.